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Muktafi
Abstract: The study of the ideas of Ibn Sînâ and Richard Swinburne as the pioneers
of Islamic philosophy and the West philosophy, and on the other hand, the existing
scholastic and ideological differences, is something that can help us to become more
familiar with the thoughts of these philosophers and intellectual differences and similarities.
In this research, with the analytical method and using the necessary documents, the
nature, types, and solutions of evil in the thought of Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne are examined,
and also the two philosophers’ thoughts about evil are compared. Both philosophers
have considered the existence of evil not in contradiction with the divine attributes,
but it is necessary for the acquisition of good.
Abstrak: Kajian terhadap pemikiran Ibn Sînâ dan Richard Swinburne tentang kejahatan
menjadi menarik untuk dianalisis karena perbedaan horizon berpikir keduanya. Jika
Ibn Sînâ mewakili tradisi filsafat Islam, maka Richard Swinburne dianggap mewakili
filsafat Barat kontemporer. Dalam artikel ini, penulis menganalisis dari dokumen kepustakaan
yang diperlukan, baik tentang sifat, jenis, dan solusi atas kejahatan menurut pandangan
Ibn Sînâ dan Swinburne. Bagi kedua filsuf, eksistensi kejahatan tidak bertentangan
dengan sifat-sifat ilahi.
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One of the problems that is always expressed as a parallel to denying the existence
of God and challenging His attributes or believing in duality is the problem of evil. Various
thinkers and sages from the time of ancient Greek philosophy have discussed and commented
on the problem of evil. In Islamic philosophy, Ibn Sînâ (980-1037 AD) is one of the philosophers
who has discussed and researched evil in his works. Ibn Sînâ considers God to be an absolute
good that is not issued except goodness from Him, and if something is considered as “evil”,
or does not exist at all (it is non-existent) or that our view considers it evil but in fact it
is good, not evil. Ibn Sînâ considers the existence of evil as a necessity of the essence of
this world and considers it as an important factor in achieving charity.1 In Western philosophy,
on the other hand, Richard Swinburne (an English philosopher born in 1934) is one of
the thinkers who has discussed and commented on this with a special influence on Christian
theology. Swinburne accepts the existence of evil in a minimal sense and considers this
minimal role necessary for the existence of a good system, he also believes that if the problem
of evil is properly understood, not only will it not be a factor in the direction of godliness,
but with them, the existence of God can be better understood.2
Investigating the nature of evil in Ibn Sînâ’s thought as a Muslim philosopher and
one of the most influential Islamic philosophers, on the other hand, Swinburne, as one of
the greatest theologians of Christianity today, is something that can clarify the differences
and intellectual similarities of these philosophers according to religious and scholastic
principles.
The problem of evil is one of the long-standing cases that has been studied and researched
throughout the history of thought. The oldest books that mention the existence of evil can
be considered Rig Veda in Hinduism and Avesta in ancient Iran. Also, in the Testaments
and the Holy Quran, many verses indicate the existence of evil.
Philosophically, the problem of evil, since it is related to the issue of existence and
non-existence, was discussed in Greek philosophy by scholars such as Plato, Aristotle, and
Xenon. In Islamic philosophy, great philosophers such as al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, Suhrawardî
al-Maqtûl, Mulla Sadra and other Islamic sages have paid attention to the problem of evil
and have discussed it in their works.
In modern times, the problem of evil is one of the most important cases in theology
and philosophy, as Spinoza states: “In contemporary times, the problem of evil has provided
the most serious rational critique of arguments based on belief in God or the absoluteness
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1 Ayman Shihadeh, “Avicenna’s Theodicy and al-Râzî’s Anti-Theodicy,” Intellectual History
of the Islamicate World 7, no. 1, (2019): 61-63. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/2212943X-
00701004.
2 Raphael Lataster, “On Richard Swinburne and the Failings of Christian Theistic Evidentialism,”
Literature and Aesthetics 26, (2016):. 32-34.
144
MIQOT Vol. 45 No. 1 January-June 2021
of its attributes, the perfection of the sacred essence. The diversity of the debate has led to
many theologians, philosophers, and thinkers in the East and the West addressing this issue.
The existence of shortcomings, distortions, all kinds of disasters and injustices in the
world of human evolution raises questions about the originality of these matters”.3
Thus far, no research has been done that independently examines and compares
the thoughts of Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne about evil, and only some articles compare the
thoughts of these philosophers with other thinkers. Like a study and comparison of evil
from the perspective of Augustine and Ibn Sînâ, written by Khalil Soultan al-Qaraei et al.
which, there is no comprehensive discussion about Ibn Sînâ’s thoughts on the evil and
from Ibn Sînâ’s point of view, there is no comprehensive discussion about the types of evil
and its solutions. Also, in the article “comparative study of the problem of evil from the point
of view of Suhrawardi and Swinburne, written by Maryam Solgi there is no discussion about
the nature of evil and its justification from the perspective of Swinburne.
The initiative of this research is to study and compare the thoughts of Ibn Sînâ and
Swinburne about evil for the first time and then a comprehensive study of the thoughts
of these philosophers about the nature, types, and solutions of evil. Man has long been faced
with these questions about the events around him, what is really evil, how did evil come
into being, or does it exist at all, and who created evil? In addition to these questions, theists
face other questions that, in a different way, can contradict their religious principles, and
how is it possible that evil is issued from God, the Absolute Benefactor? The existence of
these questions has long been a source of thought and discussion among various thinkers.
Methodology
In this research, an attempt is made to study and compare evil in the thought of Ibn
Sînâ and Richard Swinburne by using analytical capacities as well as citing reliable references,
and an attempt is made to answer these questions; what description did Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne
have of evil, is evil non-existent or existential, are the evils in contradiction with the divine
attributes, can the existence of the evils be considered as a violation of the good system
from the point of view of Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne, what are the types of evil, what solutions
did Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne state to solve the problem of evil, and what are the similarities
and differences about evil in the thought of Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne? It is these questions
that will be analyzed in this article.




Approaches to the Nature and Problem of Evil
According to Ibn Sînâ’s view, some things are permissible, their existence is free from
any evil, corruption, and others, and others are things that may not be perfected unless
they are subjected to evil when the movements and collisions of the movements. Among
these types, there are other matters that are either absolute or evil and when pure God is
the source of the existence of good and virtuous, the existence of the first type is obligatory,
such as the existence of rational essences and the like. Also, the existence of the second
type is obligatory because in not creating much good, there is a lot of evil due to avoiding
a little evil.4
Ibn Sînâ believes that since the existing world was issued by God, who is the cause
of causes, then the most perfect world will be possible, and since God is pure good, then
the world is full of goodness. He states: “The essence of the Almighty is the cause of the
export of things, not something outside of His essence, and His essence is the cause of the
system of goodness, and everything that originates from His essence must be in accordance
with His essence, and in order for God’s essence to be good, it must be good. Therefore,
everything must be regular and good because it does not contradict the essence of transcendence”.5
Ibn Sînâ in the definition of evil states: “Evil is inherently non-existence and not
every non-existence. Rather, it is the absence of perfection to which something in its kind
or nature is appropriate6 and also in al-Shifâ’ in the definition of evil, he states that evil is
a non-existent thing that has no essence but is lack of essence or imperfection for essence.7
Therefore, from Ibn Sînâ’s point of view, evil is a non-existent thing that does not exist
and its absence is the same as the lack of perfection that exists in the essence of everything.
In addition to defining evil as non-existent, Ibn Sînâ analyzes his claim regarding
some of its instances. In his view, evil is used in two senses, first to indicate imperfections
such as ignorance, inability and imperfection in creation; and second things that do not
exist externally but are perceived, such as pain and sorrow. There can be no existential
aspect for the evil. Ibn Sînâ states:
“Based on the fact that the beings of the universe are created according to the knowledge
of God, absolute good, naturally the system of existence will be the best possible system.
But this world has been questioned due to its shortcomings and evils, and doubts have
Mukhammad Zamzami, et al.: The Logical Problem of Evil in Islam and Christianity
4 Ahmad Beheshti, Tajrîd (Qom: Book Garden Institute, 2010), 360.
5 Ibn Sînâ, al-Ta‘lîqât, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmân Badawî (Qom: Islamic Media School, 1982), 159.
6 Ibn Sînâ, al-Najâh, ed. Mohammad Taghi Daneshpajooh (Tehran: University of Tehran
Press, 1986), 670.
7 Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ’ (Tehran: Nasir Khosrow Publications, 1985), 381.
8 Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, Vol. 2 (Qom: Ayatollah Marashi Najafi Library, 1993),
95.
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arisen in the minds of human beings about the goodness of this system. On the other
hand, among the attributes of God, two attributes, which are justice and wisdom, have
been confronted with doubts due to the existence of evil. God’s righteousness means
that He does not neglect the merits of any creature and gives everyone what s/he deserves,
and the meaning of being wise means that in the system of creation, there is a good
and righteous system and the best system is possible. Common problems about God’s
justice and wisdom, the existence of misery, and in other words, the problem of evil,
how evil is issued from pure good”.8
According to the proposition that God is absolute good and always wants good for
His servants, the impression is created in the mind of man that he should be in absolute joy
and happiness, but when he looks at his situation and looks at his true state, finds that in
the true sense of the word is not in absolute happiness and blessings, and has a life of ups
and downs, and this has led to the questioning of the good system and has caused doubts
about it. In the meantime, the two attributes of justice and divine wisdom have become
very suspicious in spite of human misfortunes in this world, because some people consider
the existence of these misfortunes and misery to be contrary to divine wisdom, and on the
other hand, the existence of all these problems has been avoided. Knowing justice and this
has caused doubt and objection about the divine attributes, the source of which is related
to the problem of evil in the world, and in fact this evil has required discussion of divine
attributes and has attracted the attention of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, al-Fârâbî,
Ibn Sînâ, and etc.
According to Ibn Sînâ, God is the pure giver, the giver is the one who expresses and
deserves what he deserves, without expecting any change or reward, and a being who is
pure good is impossible to create evil or export evil, so evil cannot be attributed to God.
Ibn Sînâ does not consider man’s view of evil to be true, and believes that it is the
desirability of an object in the eyes of man that determines whether it is good or evil for
man, and if the object is beneficial to man, it is good, and if has a loss, considers it evil.
Therefore, the existence of evil depends on the reputation of man, and the desirability of
the object determines its goodness or evil, and this idea of man often encounters errors and
problems and makes mistakes in cognition. Ibn Sînâ states:
“All the creations of the almighty Creator are inherently good, and God, who is the
absolute good, has created them inherently good, and there is no evil in the creations
of the almighty God, but it is the superficial view of human beings that considers things
evil”.9
Therefore, from Ibn Sînâ’s point of view, the world has abundant goodness from
9 Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ’, 419.
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the absolute good, and all the goodness of the world is created by Him, and it is the mind
of man who fails to identify correctly and considers things evil.
According to Swinburne, the existence of evil is a necessary thing for a good system,
and without the existence of evil, there will be no good system, and evil is necessary for the
existence of this world.10 Swinburne states:
“Henceforth, when I speak of the actions of the perpetrators and their characteristics,
and when I speak of the state of affairs in general, I put the good versus the bad. I use
the state of affairs in its causal sense, that is, the events that happen to people, as well
as their intentional actions. Sufferings and other afflictions and situations are bad,
and it does not seem right to call them evil, even if the factor that caused it happen has
been committed. Although the issue we are dealing with here is called the “problem
of evil”, it is in fact a matter of bad situations, as it is not permissible for a factor that can
prevent them from occurring”.11
Swinburne does not accept the non-existence of evil and believes that evil is the absence
of a state of abundant goodness, the removal of which makes it possible for charities to
exist. In fact, the absence of good in the existence and essence of any object can be an
excuse for its evil. On the other hand, Swinburne considers any factor that prevents a person
from achieving good to be evil because it also hinders the lack of goodness and the acquisition
of goodness.12
According to Swinburne, suffering and other false traits and desires are simply due
to the lack of some kind of goodness; but pain is not just a lack of pleasure and evil deeds,
it is not just a lack of good deeds, and the world can be depicted without suffering and
evil. This is why his view of the nature of evil is at odds with its non-existence. Swinburne
states that the problem of evil is not a problem that is related to the lack of many good states,
and that a large number of evils are positive because of the bad state, and that God can
eliminate them if God wills.13
Swinburne believes that we should consider the good and bad of deeds in the case
of the God of the universe in relation to the consequences of those deeds, because a phenomenon
or thing may seem evil to us, but its essence is all good, and we be unaware of it. Therefore,
we should not look at things with a superficial look, and perhaps the things that we consider
Mukhammad Zamzami, et al.: The Logical Problem of Evil in Islam and Christianity
10 David O’Connor, “Swinburne on Natural Evil from Natural Processes,” International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30, No. 2, (1991): 77-87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40020283.
11 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
3.
12 Abdullah Hosseini Eskandian and Masoumeh Rajab Nezhadian, “Evil Thought and its
Approaches with an Emphasis on Swinburne’s Theodicy of Divine Justice,” Metafizika 3, No.
4, (2020), 112.
13 Brian Leftow, “Swinburne on Divine Necessity,” Religious Studies 46, no. 2, (2010),
141-162. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25676934.
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evil are all good and blessed for us, and this is the result of an action or that phenomenon
that determines being good and evil. So, God, who is absolute good, He always gives good
to His servants and protects them from evil.
In the case of God, who is omnipotent, Swinburne states that likewise, absolute
goodness cannot be defined in this way, for He often has an infinite range of actions at
His disposal, and from whomever He chooses, one can still do better than It imagined his
power. By the same token, any world full of intelligent creatures created by him is still conceivable
that he can create a better world. In this case, nothing positive can be said about what an
absolute good God can do.
Swinburne believes that God, because He is the absolute good, always receives
good from Him and cannot be considered the source of evil, and states that I accept that
the omnipotent being can prevent the occurrence of any bad state in terms of reasonable
refusal may prevent it. But I do not accept that a being who is pure good should choose
the same. A being who is pure good, if he allows a bad state to occur, should have the right
to allow that bad state to occur.14 He also states that God cannot accomplish many good
things in the absence of bad things. The most obvious example of this rational restraint that
God is responsible for is that God cannot give us free will, which means that we can choose
between good and evil, without the natural possibility of doing evil. The fact that human
beings have the ability to create important evils is a logical consequence of the fact that they
have a free and responsible choice; even God cannot give us this choice without the possibility
of obtaining evil.15
It is interesting to analyze here that Swinburne also believes the impossible is beyond
the power of God, and that God, who is omnipotent, cannot do two impossible things,
and that He is also unable to accomplish. It is also that it is not able to achieve, for example,
two incompatible good things at the same time so that people can benefit from it. Swinburne
states that it is logically impossible for God to create good by any morally permissible
means other than allowing evil to be accomplished. For example, it is logically impossible
for God to give us the free will to choose between good and evil, and at the same time to cause
that we choose the good and it is logically impossible for God to achieve our good with such
a free will, without the evil of a bad choice being realized.16
Swinburne considers the creation of impossible things to be outside the power of
God, and by the same token believes that God is not the creator of evil, and that it is man
14 Richard Swinburne, “Some Major of Theodicy,” Daniel Howard-Snycer (ed.), The Evidertial
Argument from Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 30.
15 Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? trans. by Mohammad Javadan (Qom: Mofid University
Press, 2002), 158.
16 Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 56.
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who, by abusing his free will, causes evil. And the things that we consider evil and attribute
to God are inherently harmless and all good.
Evil Types
What is evident from Ibn Sînâ’s system of thought is that evils are not on the same
level and have different types according to the method of issuance and the source of issuance.
Whether God, man or nature, can take different theological and philosophical approaches
and provide a basis for discussion. Ibn Sînâ states:
“Evil has types that are sometimes called evil and it means a defect, and examples of
this defect are: ignorance, weakness and ugliness, and sometimes it is referred to as
evil and it means pain and sorrow, of course, pain and sorrow that to have that knowledge.
Whether the cause is incompatible with good or the absence of good causes good and
sometimes it is different from good and the one who suffers does not realize it like a cloud
that casts a shadow and prevents the sun from shining on the creature in need of light”.17
Ibn Sînâ considers evil to be limited to two parts, relative non-existence and essentially
lacking in essence, and has said things about each of these types of evil that are an estimate
of the specific ideas of his philosophical school.
Relative evil means the relation to being real; that is, it is a comparison in which the
reality of an object depends on a series of conditions, and the meaning of being absolute is
to be freed from a series of conditions. If we consider relativity in this sense, all material
and natural things are relative in that they depend on a series of finite temporal and spatial
conditions, and only in those conditions and depending on those conditions, they have
their own reality.18 According to this view, evil is a relative thing and may be a phenomenon
of evil for some people and the same phenomenon may seem good to others, and we should
note that relativity is opposite to the truth.
It is clear from Ibn Sînâ’s words that there is a logical difference between these two
statements; the statement that “evil is not in the world” is a negative academic proposition
of the simple type, while the statement that “evil in the world is of the type of non-existence”
is a positive proposition of the compound type, and Ibn Sînâ means that evil is non-existent
but it does not remove evil from the context of the system of possibility, because when it
says evil in essence, it is non-existence, and its content is that evil is a phenomenon, but
not from the type of existence, but from the type of non-existence, from the context of the
world system through service.19 It was said that evil is non-existent, but could God have
Mukhammad Zamzami, et al.: The Logical Problem of Evil in Islam and Christianity
17 Ibn Sînâ, al-Najâh, 649.
18 Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ’, 358.
19 Maryam Sadeghi, “The View of Three Muslim Wise Men on the Issue of Evil,” Sinai
Philosophy: Quarterly Journal of the Seventeenth Year, (2013).
150
MIQOT Vol. 45 No. 1 January-June 2021
created this thing in such a way that it does not have this non-existent aspect? In response,
it should be said that this non-existent aspect is inseparable from its essence. If fire wants
to be fire, it must be melting, otherwise it is no longer fire. Ibn Sînâ states:
“If it is separated from this non-existent aspect, then it has become different from itself,
as if fire has become non-fire”.20
According to Ibn Sînâ, evil is a non-existent thing for which no essence or existence
can be imagined. So evil cannot exist and the things we consider evil are in fact the estimation
of our own thoughts and not the truth and essence of those things and if time pass it or
if we pay attention to those matters with a deep look, we will realize its charity. The non-
existence of evil was first discussed in ancient Greek philosophy and later in Islamic philosophy
by philosophers such as al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, and Mulla Sadra.
On the other hand, Ibn Sînâ considers evil to be a relative thing that is different for
each person and may be a good phenomenon for one person and the same phenomenon
as evil for another person.21 In another classification, Ibn Sînâ has divided evil into essence
and non-essence. In his view, evil in essence is the same as non-existence, but not every
non-existence, but imperfection that is necessary for the type and nature of a thing, and
evil without essence is something that destroys or deprives the deserving of these perfections.22
In fact, evil is a kind of obstacle to achieving perfection, and because it prevents a person
from achieving charity, it is considered evil. It should be noted that any factor that prevents
a person from achieving good, whether it is sin, lust, malice and anything else, is considered
evil from Ibn Sînâ’s point of view.
Evil either joins matter from the beginning, or matter is exposed to evil in later stages
due to a side effect. Evil, which is related to matter itself, is evil that is attached to a particular
substance in the first stage of creation, in such a way that some external factors join evil
and replace it with a body or state that prevents the perfection of the specific talent of matter.
And it suffers from the proper evil of the said perfection like a substance that comes from
a human or a horse, whenever this substance is exposed to the causes and factors that
make its temperament and its essence undesirable, it will no longer accept the shape and
form appropriate to it, and as a result it will cause defects and ugliness in creation, and
it is not that the actual cause of causes deprivation, but the material and the acceptor lack
the talent of acceptance.23
20 Amir Abbas Alizamani and Fateme Sadat Hashemi, “Augustine’s Theory on the Problem
of Evil and Its Critique from Ibn Sina’s Perspective,” Avicennian Philosophy 19, no. 54, (2016):
103-104.; Ibn Sînâ, al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, 328.
21 Shihadeh, “Avicenna’s Theodicy”, 61-84.
22 Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ’, 416.
23 Ibid., 416.; Khalil Sultan al-Qaraei, “A Study and Comparison of Evil from the Perspective
of Augustine and Ibn Sina,” Journal of Philosophical Research 5, No. 9 (2010): 96.
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Ibn Sînâ considers evil in essence to be almost the same as non-existent evil, which
means the lack of goodness in a phenomenon or thing, and considers non-essential evil
as a factor that prevents man from acquiring goodness and reaching perfection, and this
the kind of evil can be the same evil that has been created as a pretext for the lack of goodness
of God for man and the lack of a good system in the created world.
As for Swinburne’s work, He mentions moral, natural, and compound evil, and considers
the types of evil to be limited to these three.24
Swinburne considers moral evil to be the result of human abuse of their free will. In
his theology, he emphasizes the value of free will in human beings and considers free choice
between good and evil as a great good. Swinburne sees the justification of moral evil in
goodness and believes that without the possibility of moral evil, not only will people be deprived
of the great good of choosing between good and evil, but they will at most lose the opportunity
to love God. Swinburne also acknowledges that the existence of moral evil is much greater
in the presence of an omnipotent, absolute, and pure good God than when there is no
god, but that the same moral evil exists in the presence of an omnipotent, and pure good
God. It looks more like when there is no god. But the very existence of moral evil leads to
a much higher purpose, and that is nothing but to provide the possibility of a special kind
of complete love for God.25
In his definition of moral evil, Swinburne states that my perception of moral evil is
all the bad things that human beings actually do when they either know that what they
are doing is bad and especially wrong, or that they are negligent in doing it. What they
believe is good, and especially obligatory, is ignored.26
From Swinburne’s point of view, assuming we are free, we certainly have free and
responsible choices. Humans can change themselves, others, and the world. Humans have
opportunities to provide enjoyable feelings for themselves and others, and to pursue worthwhile
and rewarding activities. Good for many actors who have the choice between good and
bad requires a high probability of moral evil. Therefore, actors to choose between good and
evil need to have some knowledge in advance, in this sense who want a series of things
that they rightly believe are evil.27 Swinburne states, “I emphasize on the basis of voluntary
defense that the natural possibility is moral evil, which is a necessary condition of abundant
good, not actual evil itself. The occurrence of evil or its non-occurrence is beyond the control
of God and is in the possession of man28
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24 Swinburne, Providence, 5.
25 Ibid., 124.; Solgi Maryam, “A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi and Swinburne on the
Problem of Evil,” Andishe-e-Novin-e-Dini 14, No. 54, (2008): 150.
26 Swinburne, Providence, 5-6.
27 Gh. Pourhassan and H. Eskandari Damaneh, “Comparison of Motahhari and Swinburne’s
Views on the Problem of Evil,” Philosophy of Religion (Nameh Hekmat) 12, no. 2, (2014): 14.
28 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 159.
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Plantinga states: According to Swinburne, the core of the theory of divine justice in
dealing with moral evil should be “voluntary defense”. But if human beings are free and
responsible, the possibility of moral evil will be necessary. The creation of creatures capable
of doing good deeds is to have power over human deeds as well. God cannot give human
beings the power to do evil deeds, but He prevents them from doing so from the beginning.
Only by removing authority can evil be prevented.29
Swinburne considers moral evil to be entirely under the sphere of human will and
free will, which God has no role in motivating the human will to do. In other words, Swinburne
believes in the complete free will of man that with this free will he can do good and also can
cause evil by abusing and crookedness. Swinburne considers the existence of moral evil
in the world and its creation by man as one of the reasons for the existence of absolute
free will in man, which, contrary to the previous view, does not play a role in determinism
and supernatural forces.
This type of evil is the same events in the natural world as floods, earthquakes, storms,
tsunamis, etc, which may always occur in different parts of the world and their natural
roots go back to nature. In defining natural evil, Swinburne states that natural evil is all
evil that humans did not intentionally create and that their occurrence was not the result
of human negligence. Natural evil includes both physical and mental suffering, and it does
not differ from humans and animals; all the effects of the suffering of patients, natural
disasters, and unexpected events that result from human beings in their lives are natural
evils.30
Swinburne believes that God created natural evil to do good and writes that I will
be there to show how natural evil makes many good things possible. Natural evil is the
range of good desires that perpetrators have or increases their susceptibility to self-cultivation
for agents such as humans who have freedom.31
Swinburne considers natural evil to be the opposite of moral evil, which, on the contrary,
is a product of nature and human beings have no role in their creation, and human will
is neutral in their creation. Of course, it should be noted that this view of Swinburne only
includes a number of examples of natural evil. Otherwise, today with the spread of technology
and human manipulation in nature, it has an important role in creating natural evil and
has de-balanced it.
Swinburne considers the greed of human beings to gain more benefits that cause
damage to nature and the environment as a compound evil.32 In fact, evil from Swinburne’s
29 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 166.
30 Eleonore Stump, “Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil,” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 14, no. 1, (1983): 49-58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40012592.
31 Swinburne, Providence, 160.; Richard Swinburne, “Natural Evil,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 15, no. 4, (1978): 295-301. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009727.
32 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 162-163.
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point of view includes evil that is a combination of moral and natural evil, but its nature
is natural and evil will is involved in its creation, such as cutting down trees that cause
floods or fires or fire of forests by humans. This approach of Swinburne is an explanation
of man’s misplaced interventions in nature and disrupting its normal order and routine,
which, because man interferes in it and upsets it out of balance, is therefore considered evil.
Solutions to the Problem of Evil
As a Muslim, Ibn Sînâ avoids dualism and the arguments surrounding it in justifying
evil, and justifies evil in terms of its non-existence and relativity. On the other hand, Ibn
Sînâ has stated that bestowing good on many is another evil solution. Ibn Sînâ believes
that God is omniscient and that nothing is beyond the scope of His knowledge and power,
and that His power dominates everything, and that if He wills, He creates everything and
everything is created according to His wisdom. On the other hand, the existence of evil does
not contradict the divine attributes such as omnipotent, pure benevolent and just, but
the existing evils in the world are a means to achieve the many and necessary good deeds
of this world. Ibn Sînâ’s solutions to solve the problem of evil are:
Ibn Sînâ considers evil to be non-existent and does not attribute any essence to it.
He states that evil has no essence, but evil is the lack of substance or lack of goodness for
the state of substance.33 In this context, Shahid Motahhari states:
“This solution seeks to disprove the duality rather than to solve the problem of evil;
according to this view, because evils are non-existent, they do not need a creator, so
because there is a species in the world that is charity, then only a creator we have and
the idea of polytheism and dualism is false”.34
According to the above definition, all evils are non-existent. When we say “evil is
non-existent”, we do not mean that there is no such thing as “evil”. As we know, there is
blindness, deafness, disease, oppression, ignorance, disability, death, earthquake, and so
on. And there is no denying the existence of these. Nor is it the case that because evil is non-
existent, then evil does not exist, then man has no duty, because man’s duty is to fight evil
and to study good, and because every situation is good and not bad, then the status quo
must be satisfied. And he considered it the best possible situation. Rather, the point is that
all of these are of the type of “non-existences” and “absences”, and the existence of these is of
the type of the existence of “deficiencies” and “gaps”, and they are evil because they themselves
are destruction and non-existence or deficiency and vacuum, or they are the source of
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destruction, non-existence, scarcity and emptiness, and the role of man in the essential
evolutionary system of the world is to compensate for the shortcomings and fill the gaps.35
Those who have considered evil not as non-existent but as existential have often
used it to deny the existence of God. On the other hand, considering evil as non-existent,
this view is rejected and cannot be a reason to deny the existence of God.
Other than that, Ibn Sînâ considers another justification of evil in its relativity and
believes that evils are not absolute and are relative because a phenomenon may be useful
for one person or object and the same phenomenon may appear as evil for another person
or object. As a result, evil is relative and not absolute, and may appear different in different
situations.36
There are two types of evils; evils that are non-existent and evils that are existential
and are bad because they are the source of a series of non-existent things. Evils that are
non-existent, such as ignorance, helplessness, poverty, are real but non-existent attributes.
Still, existential evils are bad because they are the source of non-existent things, such as
floods, earthquakes, stings, and germs, which are undoubtedly relative badness.37
God’s intention and purpose are, first and foremost, attributed to the existence, which
is the aspect of the goodness of things, but from these evil beings arises that which is not the
main purpose of God, but second and breadth, is the purpose of God. The goodness of a bee
is that it has a sting to defend itself and the evil of its sting is for humans or other creatures.38
The relativity of evil places more emphasis on the analogy of a phenomenon and an
object that is considered evil; if considered with other phenomena and objects, it is considered
good. For example, a bomb blast in the mountains for mining, although it may destroy
ants and some surrounding animals, can ultimately reveal a large number of mineral reserves
for humans, which is not a case of discovering mineral reserves for humans, and on the
other hand, because it destroys some animals and creatures, it is evil. Therefore, evil is a
relative and comparative thing that may always vary in different situations.
Ibn Sînâ considers evil to be a necessity of the natural world and believes that this
world would not be a novel world without the existence of evil because the world without
evil was already created by God.39 Therefore, in his view, the existence of evil is an inherent
feature of the present world. He states:
35 Swinburne, Is There a God?, 159.
36 al-Qaraei, “A Study and Comparison of Evil”, 95-96. See also Shihadeh, “Avicenna’s
Theodicy”, 61-84.
37 Eskandian and Nezhadian, “Evil Thought and its Approaches”, 109.
38 Akram Khalili Nooshabadi, God of Love and the Problem of Evil: Description, Review,
and Critique of the Theological Irenaeus and the Cultivation of the Soul of John Hick (Qom: Taha
Cultural Institute, 2016), 22.
39 Sayeh Meisami, “Ibn Sînâ’s Philosophical Interpretation of Sûrat al-Falaq,” al-Bayan:
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“If all the subsequent evils of the beings of the material world are removed, they will
become the beings of the first kind, that is, the beings of the world of intellects, while
the intellectual and celestial beings, who are pure good and pure light, were created
before. They must be created, otherwise the burden of transcendence will be questioned.
Therefore, either these creatures should not have been created or they should have
become the first type, and both cases require the non-issuance of existential grace by
the absolute grace, and this is not worthy of the Almighty God.40 He also states: “If the
material world, which is inextricably linked with evil, was created in such a way that
no evil is realized at all, it would no longer be a material world, but another purely good
world”.41
In Ibn Sînâ’s view, the evil in the world is not only a violation of the good system; on
the contrary, it is an inseparable feature of the current world system.
One of the most important arguments that has been made as a response to evil is
the dominance of the charitable aspect over the evil of the universe. According to this idea,
although there are some evils in the world and some of them, such as earthquakes and
floods, are the product of nature and some, such as murder and slavery, are the result of
human malice, but it should be noted that the good of the world is more than its evils.
Ibn Sînâ is also among those who consider one of the ways of evil to be the spread
of abundance and charity to the evil and states: “Although the sum of evils, such as diseases
in the universe, is many, it is not a majority, and domination is still with charity. It is evil
that damages the primary perfections”.42 He also considers the evil that is considered as
a defect for secondary perfections, although it is maximum, but he considers this evil not
as an act of the doer but as a lack of action of the doer, which is due to lack of ability and talent,
and believes that such an evil It does not indicate a complete lack of good.
In dealing with the problem of evil, thinkers fall into two categories; some, such as
Plato, Augustine, Leibniz, and many Islamic philosophers, have tried to make the problem
of evil a violation of the attributes of God by recognizing the existing system and offering
various solutions and arguments. On the other hand, people like J.L. Mackie43 and William
L. Rowe44, considering the evil as irrational, have stated it as a reason to deny the existence
of God and have considered the problem of evil as a refuge for their atheism. From Plato
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and Augustine, he did not contrast evils with the divine attributes of benevolence, justice,
and wisdom, and sought solutions to the problem of the evils.
Swinburne believes that despite evil we can achieve many good deeds and to achieve
some good deeds, the existence of evil is necessary in the world. In fact, evil is necessary
for achieving some good deeds, and small evil should not be preferred to great good. He
believes that evils come into being in order to achieve superior goodness. He says about how
the pure God can allow evil to happen. Swinburne believes that evil comes together in order
to achieve superior goodness. He talks about how the pure God can allow evil to happen,
so he states: if a god who is pure good allows a bad state like E to occur, then:
1. He must have the right to allow this to happen.
2. Allowing E to occur is the only morally probable way to achieve a good state like G.
3. God does everything else through which G can be obtained.
4. The value expected in prescribing E is positive; that is, it is worth allowing the initial
evil to occur.45
According to Swinburne, God does not allow evil to occur in the universe except
because the existence of that evil is a source of good for man and by its occurrence, provides
a lot of good for man.46 In fact, evil does not happen by divine will and If they happen, they
have so much good and blessing with them that it should not be referred to as evil, but it
should be considered as a lot of good from pure good.
Swinburne believes that the problem of evil is not the lack of many good states, and
although God creates a lot of good, he can create more good things, for example, that death
is not evil in itself, death is the end of a good state, that is, life. Death may be evil if it arrives
late or causes great sorrow to others, but death itself is not evil.47 Swinburne, therefore,
believes in a large number of evils, that is, bad and positive states that God can eliminate.48
From Swinburne’s point of view, beauty is not achieved in detail. When we look at
only one part of a painting, that part may not look beautiful to us, but when we consider
the whole painting, then that we can see its true beauty, and it is with a holistic view that
we can realize the ultimate beauty. The same is true of music, as a note cannot be so pleasing,
but when the set of notes are put together in a certain order, then it can be uplifting and
refreshing for us.49 From Swinburne’s point of view, the universe is also mixed with good
45 Swinburne, Providence, 3.
46 Richard Swinburne, “Theodicy, Our Well-Being, and God’s Rights,” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 38, No. 1/3, (1995): 75-91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40020330.
47 Maryam, “A Comparative Study of Suhrawardi and Swinburne”, 155.
48 Swinburne, Providence, p, 47.
49 Ibid., 49.
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and evil, and without the existence of evil, this world will not have its supreme beauty, and
the existence of evil is necessary for the good system of this world.
Another of Swinburne’s solutions to the problem of evil is to create goodness and
compassion for evil. Some might say that if sympathy is desirable in a situation of suffering,
then it is better than a situation in which there is no pain at all, but Swinburne believes
that a world with such suffering and such feeling is at least as good as a world without
suffering and without foundation and emotion, because it is good for us to have a deep
concern for others. Man can not worry about the condition of others unless something
bad happens or is probably bad, if things are always good for humans, there will be no
opportunity for deep worry.50
The worst evil must be defeated with the highest goodness. Only through the goodness
of God can the terrible evil be overcome. They are equally disproportionate to human
nature, sharing in the terrible evil and living close to loving God. Because closeness to God
thus transcends relationships with any creature, entering into man’s personal relationship
with God gives meaningful constructive value and mean to horrific suffering. This result
is consistent with this Christian intuition that [although] the forces of darkness are stronger
than man, they do not tolerate God’s goodness bestows on man.51
In his works, Swinburne has also offered a solution to the problem of moral evil. Swinburne
argues that in order for human beings to cause or prevent moral evil, it is necessary for
them to acquire knowledge, and if human beings are to acquire knowledge, natural evils
must necessarily occur because certain knowledge of what will happen in the future can
only be obtained by inferring from examples that occurred in the past. Suppose human
beings seek to create a situation through their actions or ignorance that causes or avoids
evil consequences in the long run. In that case, they must know the consequences of their
actions to acquire knowledge, and the most certain knowledge can be obtained from the
past history of man.52
According to Swinburne, by acquiring knowledge about moral evil, we can prevent
them from committing subconsciously without being aware of the evil of these acts. He
believes that acquiring knowledge is a fundamental way to prevent moral evil.
Conclusion
The problem of evil is a long-standing case that has always raised questions for
man about God and the universe. Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne are among the philosophers
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who have dealt with and discussed the problem of evil in their works. Swinburne has proposed
theodicy to solve the problem of evil, but Ibn Sînâ has discussed this in various sections in
his works and has explained the problem of evil. Ibn Sînâ considers evil to be a non-existent
thing that has no essence and existence and is a lack of perfection. This view of Swinburne
is also in conflict with Christian theology, because in the philosophy of Augustine and Aquinas,
from which Swinburne was greatly influenced, evil is expressed as non-existent.
Both philosophers believe that the problem of evil cannot be considered a factor in
denying God, because God is not the creator of evil, and it is man who creates evil by his own
will. On the other hand, both consider the existence of evil as an inseparable necessity of
this world, without which the good aspect of this world cannot be considered, and it is
with the presence of evil that the goodness of the world is revealed. Both philosophers have
considered the role of imperfection in the definition of evil and have considered evil as an
imperfection that the object is inherently devoid of it.
Ibn Sînâ considered the types of evil to be limited to relative non-existent evil and
in essence and believes that evil is a non-existent thing that does not exist and what is
considered evil is also a relative thing that for different people may be a phenomenon of
evil and the same phenomenon is good for another person. For example, rain can be
good for a farmer who has been waiting for rain for a long time to irrigate his farmland,
but the same rain is evil because it destroys the earthenware jars that put their jars in the
open air to dry. Also, in terms of time, evil is a relative thing and it is possible that at one
time it is considered an evil phenomenon, and the same phenomenon is considered good in
another period. For example, a flood that is first considered evil for a person, if after cut it, we
realize that it has taken a treasure from the mountain with itself, and it is no longer considered
evil but good. Evil in itself refers to the non-existent aspect of evil and the lack of perfection
in it, and evil is also referred to as factors that prevent a person from achieving good, and
these factors can be sin, lust, or anything else. But Swinburne, unlike Ibn Sînâ, divides evil
according to the origin of evil and attributes moral evil to man, natural to nature, and
compound to both. Swinburne mostly considers evil to be the estimation of human will
and free will, which can be created by human misuse. The origin of the division of evil is one
of the important aspects in explaining the intellectual differences between Ibn Sînâ and
Swinburne about evil.
In terms of evil solutions, Ibn Sînâ has stated that non-existence and relativism are
evil solutions that Swinburne does not believe it. But both philosophers believe that evil is
necessary for this world, and it is in spite of evil that charity finds meaning. On the other
hand, the existence of evil is necessary for the acquisition of good, and the identity of many
charities is not understood without the existence of evil, such as health and security, or that
which is not achieved, such as self-sacrifice. In their works, Ibn Sînâ and Swinburne have
tried to glorify the divine attributes of limitation by evil and have tried to show the existence
of a minimal evil compatible with the existence of a just, wise and absolute benevolent Creator.
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